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4ABSTRACT
A price rise signifies a fall in purchasing power, if there is no
commensurate increase in income. Thus the pertinent question in the
face of the phenomenal rise during the 1990s in the prices of the food
articles, which account for a major chunk of the total expenditure of the
poor, is whether there has been a corresponding increase in the incomes
of the poor. The present paper is a modest attempt at analysing the answer
to this question. Our focus is on the agricultural workers, for whom
wages constitute the principal source of income and the important channel
affecting poverty. There is evidence that rural poverty at the all-India
level and across several States increased significantly especially during
the first 18 months of the reform period. It is argued that the phenomenal
administered price inflation of food articles, thanks to liberalisation
measures, has had much to do with this situation. We show that the subsidy
cuts and the consequent price rises, unless followed by compensating
measures, will perforce reduce the consumption level of the vulnerable
group of the population; in fact, subsidy cut is found to entail higher
costs in compensation to keep their consumption at least at the same
level. Moreover, expressing the consumption changes of the poor in terms
of the relative compensation for the rich, we find from empirical facts
that the poor are left as a losing lot. We also estimate State-specific rural
poverty line wage rates for the 1990s and find that by 1998-99, only
three States in India, Kerala, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, had a
sufficient real income, that is, a nominal wage rate higher than the rural
poverty line wage rate; the agricultural wage rates in all other 13 States
could not catch up with even the minimum possible poverty line wage
rate
JEL Classification: C60, D10, D63, H20, I32, J31.
Key words:  Liberalisation, agricultural labourers, rural poverty, wages,
inflation, subsidy, India.
5'Therefore take the talent from him, and give it to him who has
ten talents. For unto everyone who has,
more will be given, and he will have abundance;  but from him
who does not have, even what he has will be taken away.'
- Matthew  25: 28-29
'In the long run, we are all dead.'
- J. M. Keynes
1. Introduction
The generally accepted major goals of economic policy in India
have been growth, price stability, and economic justice.  Economic history
is claimed to have witnessed an association between periods of inflation
and rapid economic growth (Hamilton 1952; Keynes 1930: Chapter 30),
with explicit regressive distributional consequences (Keynes op. cit.),
thus introducing a grain of incongruity among these objectives. Although
the relation between the first two (i.e., whether inflation, intended for
development, is conducive to high rates of voluntary savings and capital
formation, essential for economic growth) might still be an unresolved
contention, the role of price stability in ensuring economic justice goes
6beyond doubt: inflation tends to increase income inequalities and to
ineffectuate anti-poverty programmes.
It goes without saying that price rises hurt the poor more and harm
the goal of social justice. Despite this fact, the poor in India appear to
have always been at the losing end of the policy games of the polity,
whatever be the national slogans, whether for a socialistic society or for
a market economy. Inflation has always been corroding the economic
value of their everyday life, wherever be its source, whether in the
unyielding state of the nature, or in deficit financing of economic
development, or in administrative price hikes, or in economic
liberalisation. Thus the last four decades witnessed a thirty-fold increase
in the food prices at the wholesale level, the prices much more than
doubling in each decade; and the first half of the 1990s heated the
economy up in exceptionally hyper inflation in facilitating liberalisation.
Liberalisation
 The first signal for launching a liberalised economy flashed across
India from the Union Budget for 1991-92, in response to the ‘severe
fiscal crisis’ of the previous year. The period had a lesson for India ‘that
the economy needed substantial reforms if the crisis was to be fully
overcome…Both the balance of payments problems which were building
up over the past few years and the persistent inflationary pressure were
the results of large budgetary fiscal deficits which characterised the
economy year after year….A reversal of the trend of fiscal expansionism
was essential to restore macroeconomic balance in the economy.’
(Government of India 1991-92 Part 1: 11). That is, the desired
macroeconomic stabilisation was to be achieved through fiscal discipline,
the resolution for which was in turn reflected in the Budget decision to
abolish export subsidies, to increase fertiliser prices, and to take steps to
keep non-plan expenditures in check (ibid.). In the initial years of
7transition, most of the administered items,1  such as steel, non-ferrous
metals, fertilisers (except urea), lubricating oil, and so on, were
decontrolled/decanalised to avoid the burden of subsidisation. The
category of administered items now includes petroleum and petroleum
products,2  urea fertilisers, coal and electricity. In the same year, ‘In
order to reduce the fiscal deficit, the Government …..had to permit an
increase in some administered prices of some basic goods and services.’
(op. cit.: 21). And this continued in the following years also,3  with the
result, for example, that the electricity prices in general almost tripled in
the 10 years of liberalisation. Decontrolling fertiliser prices also had the
same effect, while the prices of iron and steel and non-ferrous metals
nearly doubled (see Table 1). Note that these products being important
factor inputs, their price rises had cascading impacts across the economy.
Indeed, the first six years of the 1990s constitute the longest period of
sustained double-digit inflation in independent India; and that too under
conditions of good monsoon in all the six years!
1 It should be remembered at this point that unlike in the erstwhile socialist countries,
price freezing was never resorted to in India, though administered pricing was in
force for a large number of commodities – vital raw material inputs, essential
consumer goods, or goods having pervasive influence on the growth and
development of the economy and on the welfare of a broad cross section of the
consumer – such as minerals, petroleum crude and natural gas, fuel, power, light
and lubricants and a number of important manufactured products, viz., iron and
steel, non-ferrous metals (excluding aluminium) and fertilisers. Administered pricing
policy aimed at price stabilisation of critical commodities through subsidisation.
Regular upward revisions of these prices were very much in force, though.
2 As of April 1, 2002, the government was supposed to have ended the administrative
pricing of auto-fuels – petrol and diesel – and domestic fuels – kerosene and cooking
gas. However, the government held the price line following the renewed volatility
in the global oil prices, following turmoil in West Asia and restocking of the US
strategic reserves.
3 ‘Subsidies on a number of products with administered prices were reduced to bring
down the fiscal deficit. This raised their prices.’ (Government of India 1992-93: 80).
8Price Inflation
The most devastating effect of subsidy cuts was experienced in
the case of the food articles (Table 1) 4,  on which the poor spend a major
part of their meagre income. The general price level was primarily fed
and led by the prices of food articles, as the relative prices during this
period show. While the annual average inflation rate of food grains at
the wholesale level in the 1980s was about 6. 5 percent, it was about
10.8 percent in the 1990s, (and 11.3 percent in the first half of the decade)
the price level having a nearly three-times rise, thanks particularly to the
government's regular moves of enhancing procurement prices of paddy
and wheat substantially in favour of the large landlords to compensate
for the subsidy cuts in input prices. For instance, the increase in the
procurement price of common paddy (and wheat) in 1993-94 over 1990-
91 was Rs. 105 (Rs. 125) per quintal. Such moves have been pregnant
with two built-in forces of inflation.5  At the wholesale level, food grains
prices have been pushed up, since the procurement prices serve as a
floor to their open market prices. Further, the increased procurement
prices have forced the government to increase the issue prices of rice
and wheat of the public distribution system (PDS) to a large extent in
order to keep the food subsidy within manageable limits - during the
4 ‘Primary goods led the inflationary surge with an inflation rate of 21.6 percent in
the middle of November 1991; the pressure on food grains prices was even
higher...…. The spurt in food grain prices pushed up consumer prices both in rural
and urban areas’ (Government of India 1992–93: 72). ‘This is rather surprising
given the good harvest’ (Government of India 1993–94: 62; italics ours).
5 ‘An upward revision of issue prices under the PDS for wheat…and for rice….and
the higher minimum support price (MSP) payable to farmers for wheat and rice
were apparently the main factors for this uptrend. Thus administered prices operating
under PDS and the MSP (or procurement prices) provided a floor below which
food grain prices could not have fallen even though improved production and supply
situation warranted a price fall’ (Government of India 1993–94: 62; italics ours).
9same period, the increase in the issue price of rice (and wheat) was
Rs. 148 (Rs. 96) per quintal. Thus the government, it is significant to
note, has in effect been redistributing income from the poor to the rich
landlords through administrative price inflation. The rise in procurement
price has in turn led to an exceptional increase in procurement, resulting
in a decline in open market availability and the consequent price inflation.6
A price rise signifies a fall in purchasing power, if there is no
commensurate increase in income. A three-fold price rise cuts the
purchasing power of a rupee down to a one-third, necessitating an equal
increase in income.  Thus the pertinent question in the face of the
phenomenal rise during the 1990s in the prices of the food articles, which
account for a major chunk of the total expenditure of the poor, is whether
there has been a corresponding increase in the incomes of the poor. The
present paper is a modest attempt at analysing the answer to this question.
Our focus is on the agricultural workers, for whom wages constitute the
principal source of income and the important channel affecting poverty.
The relative incidence of poverty has been found to be more severe among
agricultural workers (Pant and Patra 2001). According to the NSS
quinquennial surveys, agricultural wage earners accounted for about 46.8
percent of the rural poor in 1987-88 (Sen 1996), and 51.87 percent in
1993-94 (Dev and Ranade 1997).
6 In addition to this, ‘The tariff reform, which reduced customs duties across the
board, was sought to be made revenue neutral not through an increase in indirect
taxes that would reduce the disposable incomes of the rich and dampen inflation,
but through increases in indirect taxes on commodities that fuel inflation and squeeze
the real incomes of the poor.’ (Mahmud 2001:27).
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‘Poverty Debate’
A heated debate has been raging in the informed circle as to whether
the liberalisation process in India has resulted in an increase in poverty.
Despite the differences in estimates, it is found that rural poverty in
India did increase in the initial years of the 1990s (till 1992-93 over
1989-90) (World Bank estimates in Datt 1999;  Jha 1999; Tendulkar et
al. 1993; Tendulkar 1998), and in 1994-95 (World Bank estimates in
Datt 1999) and in 1997-98 (Planning Commission, as reported in Ghosh
2000). Immediately after the initial surge of reforms, rural poverty in
1992 increased by around 25 percent. Sen (1996), Nayyar (1998), and
Patnaik (1999), to name a few, infer this increase in rural poverty as due
to reforms, while Tendulkar and Jain (1995), Tendulkar (1997), and Joshi
and Little (1997), among others, hold the bad weather primarily
responsible for it. Sen's contention bracketing rural poverty rise and
economic reforms stems from the observed fall in government
expenditure that resulted from the concerns over the macroeconomic
stabilisation. This in turn led to a decline in the proportion of the non-
agricultural labour force (for example, by about 16.3 per cent in 1992),
forcing a steep fall in agricultural wages and a consequent increase in
rural poverty. The drop in agricultural production thanks to bad weather
and the resultant sharp increase in inflation, according to him, were not
large enough to explain the rural poverty increase.
However, Radhakrishna and Ravi (1992) prove, by establishing
an inverse association between inflation rate and total expenditure in
1990-91, that the hyperinflation of 1990-91 did hurt the poor. Since the
wages of the rural labour are not indexed, they do not feel optimistic that
the nominal expenditure of the poor would have increased enough to
neutralise the effect of the steep increases in the prices of food articles.
Sen (1996) claims that inclusion of relative price of food (RPF) in
econometric models along with other explanatory variables such as
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agricultural productivity and public development expenditure leads to a
much better explanation of pre- and post-reform poverty in India than
the models ignoring RPF. Ravallion (1998), based on NSS data from
1958 to 1993-94, finds a high correlation (0.76) between poverty and
RPF, (though he does not use his result for an attack on reforms but
maintains that this correlation is not an explanation of the adverse
distributional effects of changes in RPF, but due to the mean effect through
depressed mean per capita consumption). Nayyar (1998) does not find it
surprising that the incidence of poverty registered a significant increase
in the early 1990s, given the hyperinflation in food. Similarly,
Maheshwari (2002) shows that the food grains price rise during the reform
period, thanks to the structural adjustment-related policies (as argued by
Sen), is significant in explaining the increase in rural poverty in 1992.
It is in this background that we attempt to analyse the plight of the
rural poor in India in the face of inflation vis-à-vis income changes. In
the next section, we discuss, in a simple model, the cost of economic
liberlisation a la subsidy cuts that entails more than proportionate
compensatory increases in the incomes of the poor. In the third section
we analyse whether the subsidy cuts implied in the steep administered
price inflation facing the poor were effectively compensated by
corresponding income increases. Here we make use of an alternative
analytical measure of rural poverty line wage rate.   The last section
briefly concludes the study.
2. The Cost of Liberalisation
In this section we attempt to analyse the implications for the poor
of the government’s resolve to cut subsidies. The government can claim
to counter the effect of the administered price inflation thanks to subsidy
loss with compensating measures, say, in terms of income increases
including transfers. It follows that unless the poor are provided with
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adequate income, their share in total national product would perforce
fall. In relation to his rich neighbour, poking a big spoon into the (small)
bowl, his position is more vulnerable; he must be compensated for the
loss in subsidy with a more than proportionate increase in income. But,
this, we argue, would entail higher costs to keep the consumption share
of the poor at least at the same level; that is, the compensation required
would be much higher than the subsidy taken away. This we formally
show below.
The total consumption (ci) of a household i is described by a
(linearly homogeneous) Cobb-Douglas function in its nominal income
yi and the price level facing it pi :
αα −
=
1
iii pAyc ….. (1)
This in turn yields the real consumption qi of the household as a
function of its purchasing power, yi  / pi  :
α)/(/ iiiii pyApcq =≡ …  (2)
Log-differentiating the function gives the percentage change in
the real consumption of the ith household:
)py(q iiii  −= ε ….. (3)
where εi is the real income elasticity of consumption and a dot above a
variable indicates percentage change. Thus a drop in the purchasing power
( ii yp  >  ) is translated proportionally into consumption ( iq  < 0). Let
us consider two households, poor (i = 1) and non-poor (i = 2). We are
interested in finding the effect on consumption of the poor of subsidy
removal vis-a-vis wage increases (and transfers). The price in the
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liberalisation period, facing the poor household, say, p1 is now devoid of
subsidy, taken as a fraction  s  of price p1, and is  higher  than  the  pre-
liberalisation period price, p1(1 – s). This gives the percentage increase
in price (inflation rate):  1p  = s/(1 – s), which is obviously greater than
the subsidy rate, s. That is, when a subsidy is cut leading to a price rise,
the rate of inflation thus brought about will be greater than the rate of
subsidy that is cut. This has very significant implications as shown below.
The household’s wage income, y1, in the second period is assumed to
be higher than in the first period by an increase, say,  t.  Thus we have
1y  = t. Hence
11 ε=q  (t – r), ….. (4)
where r = s/(1 – s), is the forgone-subsidy odds. The cost of subsidy cut
is obviously very high in terms of the required income increase, t.7   To
replace a 50 percent or more subsidy, a 100 percent or more income
increase (t) is required, so that the consumption of the poor does not fall
( ≥1q  0), because a 50 percent subsidy cut implies a 100 percent price
rise. When s = 1/4,  t should be equal to or greater than 1/3 for   ≥1q  0.
The non-poor also have the benefits of subsidies through lower
prices and other means as also of increased earnings; taking these benefits
as proportions α and β of those actually meant for the poor, we have
2p  = βr, and 2y = α t.
7 Note that income need to increase in the same (absolute) amount as the subsidy cut
implicit in a price rise for the consumption not to fall. Hence, it may be argued that
the rate of growth of income (which is what we consider here) be just equal to the
rate of subsidy that was cut However, it goes without saying that the first (sentence)
does not imply the second. Moreover, the nature of (implicit) subsidy is such that
it is possible to show that this argument is just unsustainable and a logical conclusion
is obtained only in our result. For a detailed discussion, see the appendix.
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The total national product is q = q1 + q2, and the percentage change
in it is
q  =  (1 – ω) 1q + ω 2q , ….. (5)
where  ω = q2/q.
In the short run,  q  =  0, and substituting in (5) for   1q and  2q  ,
we can determine the equilibrium t in terms of the forgone-subsidy odds:
t =    ηρα
ηρβ
+
+ r)(
,                        …..(6)
where  η  =  ε1/ε2, and ρ = (1 –  ω)/ω.
Substituting (6) in (4) yields the percentage change in the
consumption (portion of the total product) of the poor in relation to that
of the non-poor:
ηρα
αβε
+
−
=
r
q
)(1
1
                                  ….. (7)
If the status quo  in  respect  of  the  benefits  to  the non-poor is
maintained, i.e., β = α, the wage income increases of the poor are
determined just to cover the forgone-subsidy odds, t = r, and his
consumption level remains the same. However, if non-poor are
compensated more than proportionately, i.e., α > β, then t < r, and the
consumption of the poor falls and vice versa. It is intuitively interesting
to find that if the compensation accruing to the non-poor is higher than
they are entitled to as determined by the previous level, the compensation
for the poor (as well as their consumption) is reduced to that extent. It
then simply means that in the short run, when the supply is fixed, the
process of distribution of the total product is a zero-sum game; some
gain at the loss of others. Since the gains/losses are directed by the relative
15
changes in the purchasing power, it is imperative that the poor be
compensated more than proportionately; that the income of the poor
increase by a greater proportion than that of the rich. But, as we have
already seen, such compensation involves costs that exceed the subsidies,
cut in the process of liberalisation.
3. Analysis
Income Growth-Inflation Dynamics
Now we turn to look for the implications of the effect of
liberalisation on the cost of living of the poor. Our focus is on the
agricultural workers across 16 States who constitute a major chunk of
the rural poor. Our concern is to find whether the price rises have
worsened their already vulnerable position. An analysis of the changes
in their purchasing power over time is in order here. We start our
discussion with a comparison of the increases in the agricultural wages
and price inflation, assuming that the agricultural wages constitute the
sole source of income for these workers (y1 ≡ w), and the price level
facing them is represented by the consumer price index for agricultural
labourers (CPI-AL). Table 2 gives the average agricultural nominal wage
rates in the major 16 States of India during the period from 1989-90 to
1998-99. While in 1989-90, Haryana, Punjab and Kerala in that order
led others in average agricultural wage rates, by 1989-99, Kerala surged
far ahead of others in wage increase. Haryana followed Kerala, but Punjab
lagged much behind in growth. It is significant to note that the all-India
average agricultural wage rate in 1998-99 was less than half of the Kerala
wage rate, and so it was for all these States except Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh and Punjab; even the wage rate in Haryana was only nearly 70
percent of that of Kerala. The estimates of the cumulative growth in
each year over 1989-90 provide a better comparative measure of changes
in income and cost of living relative to the level on the eve of the
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liberalisation. Thus we find that the agricultural wages in India on average
increased by about 189 percent in 1998-99 over 1989-90 (or equivalently,
about 2.9 times), with an annual average growth rate of 12.5 percent
(Table 3). Only six States could grow better than the national average,
Kerala leading the list with a 4.5 times rise. It should be pointed out that
in all these States, money wages more than doubled in 9 years, Assam
and Bihar having the least increase.
The cost of living of these workers on the other hand increased on
average only by about 135 percent (or equivalently, 2.35 times) during
this period, at an annual average growth rate of about 10 percent
(Table 4).8  It is significant to note that the State level estimates of CPI-
AL cumulative growth for 1998-99 were distributed very thickly around
that of the national average, implying low variability across States (note
that the coefficient of variation was drastically falling over time), or
more aptly, suggesting a convergence in the structure of the cost of living
across the length and breadth of the economy. In the case of the
cumulative increases in agricultural wages, however, there remained
higher variability across the States; the corresponding coefficient of
variation, after a steep fall, was increasing steadily over time. Also note
that the promising positive gap between the growth rates of wages and
price indices at the national average level apparently extended by 1998-
99 to all but two States, viz., Assam and Bihar. This in terms of equation
(3) suggests positive change in real consumption of the poor in all except
these two States. However, more light is obtained from a look across
time and space from Table 5 that explains equation (3) in terms of the
real wage rate of the agricultural workers (taking   wy  =1 , where  w is
the wage rate).
8 The CPI–AL (food) has almost the same structure with marginally lower growth
rates in most of the States and at national level.
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Real Agricultural Wage Rate
As expected, an appreciable increase in the real wages has occurred
only in the case of Kerala. Only in 1993-94 Kerala experienced a fall in
real agricultural wage rate during this period. Tamil Nadu and to a less
extent Gujarat appear to have some promising prospects. In general,
however, for a majority of the States, the real wages (and thus the
purchasing power) of the agricultural workers declined, over the previous
period, in 1990-91 (7 States), 1991-92 (10 States), 1993-94 (7 States),
1994-95 (9 States), 1995-96 (6 States) and 1998-99 (10 States). In Assam
and Bihar, real wages were steadily falling over time. And in Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar and Karnataka, the average real wage rate for the
1990s was less than the 1989-90 level.
In 1989-90, Kerala ranked only third to Haryana and Punjab in
terms of higher real wage rate of the agricultural workers, and continued
to remain behind till 1994-95. Since 1995-96, Kerala has surged forward
to the first place with tremendous steam of growth, having a real wage
rate more than three-and-a-half times that of Orissa in 1998-99. Orissa
has mostly been the last in the list.
Now let us interpret equation (3) in terms of a ratio of the
cumulative growth of money wages to that of CPI-AL, i.e.,  ( 1/ pw  ),
where p1 stands for CPI-AL. Where ( 1/ pw   ) < 1, we have a fall in the
real consumption of the poor ( 1q   < 0). With this interpretation, we find
(in Table 6) that consumption of the agricultural workers tended to fall
in most of the years during the 1990s in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar,
Karnataka, and West Bengal. In the first year of the liberalisation, as
many as 7 States appear to have experienced a fall in consumption of the
poor; in the next year, 10 States; and in 1994-95, six States. The number
steadily decreased over time, and in 1998-99, only in Assam and Bihar
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the ratio fell below unity. After Kerala, Tamil Nadu appears to have fared
much better. On average, however, during the 1990s, Andhra Pradesh,
Assam, Karnataka, and West Bengal seem to have suffered from a fall in
consumption of the poor; and in Bihar, it remained almost constant. This
in turn suggests that on average income of the rural poor had not risen in
these States to the extent it should have, to neutralise the price rise, though
by 1998-99, only Assam and Bihar continued to be in deep waters. Andhra
Pradesh also seems to be too weak to forge ahead. Another significant
case is that of Punjab, where the relative income growth was steadily
falling during this period, portending a probable fall in future
consumption.
Implied Subsidy Cuts
Remember we have found that price inflation may be represented
in terms of forgone-subsidy odds:  1p = s/(1 – s), which in turn yields an
estimate of the subsidy cut implied in that price (CPI-AL) inflation. Table
7 presents these estimates.9  It is seen that the rise in the rural cost of
living in India involved an implicit subsidy cut to the tune of nearly 60
percent by 1998-99 over 1989-90, almost uniformly across the States.
This in turn requires, as we know, a costly compensation, in terms of
increase in income by about 150 percent, so that consumption is not
adversely affected. All States except Assam and Bihar could manage it
by 1998-99, as we have already seen. By 1996-97, it was about 50 percent,
requiring 100 percent income rise; and Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, and
West Bengal had failed to reach that level. The last two managed to
cross the unit mark by 1997-98.
9 There is hardly any significant difference in the estimates, when we use CPI–AL
(Food) instead of the general index.
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PDS Issue Price Inflation
We can have more corroborative and direct evidences in favour of
these results by considering the cumulative inflation of food price level
rather than that of cost of living index (general/food). It should be noted
that a major chunk of the income of the rural poor is spent on food, and
that they heavily depend upon supply from fair price shops. Hence the
significance of an analysis of the effect of the issue price rises, instead
of CPI inflation. The public distribution system (PDS) in India had been
a significant factor of the poverty alleviation strategy aiming to enhance
the food security especially for the poor. This role, however, was lost in
the administered price inflation of the 1990s that made the PDS issue
prices skyrocket and narrow the differential between market price and
PDS price (Government of India 1993-94: 67). In five years, the central
issue price of common rice increased by 120 percent over 1989-90 (i.e.,
2.2 times) and that of wheat, nearly cent percent, with annual average
growth rates of 17.1 percent and 14.5 percent respectively. There was no
price revision for the next two years, and in June, 1997, the targeted
public distribution system (TPDS) was introduced with dual prices, one
for families below the poverty line (BPL), equivalent to 50 per cent of
the economic cost to the Food Corporation of India (FCI), and the other
for families above the poverty line (APL), equal to the full economic
cost. The BPL issue price of common rice increased from Rs. 350 to
Rs. 565 per quintal in three years from 1997-98, and the APL price from
Rs.  700 to Rs. 1130 per quintal during the same period, both growing at
an annual average rate of 17.3 percent. For wheat, the price rises were
from Rs. 250 to Rs. 415 per quintal (BPL - at a growth rate of 18.4
percent) and from Rs. 450 to Rs. 830 per quintal (APL - at a growth rate
of 22.6 percent) over the three years. As the ‘increase in Central issue
price does serve as a new floor price for the open market price’ (ibid.),
issue price inflation transmits its shock directly to the open market. Thus,
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in the five years we considered above, the wholesale price index (WPI)
for rice increased by 75.2 percent and for wheat by 86.2 percent over
1989-90, though these rises were only a fraction10  (63 and 89 percent
respectively) of the issue price inflation.
It should be remembered that the end retail PDS prices are fixed
by the States (and Union Territories) after taking into account margins
for the wholesalers and retailers, transportation charges, levies, local
taxes, etc. Some States still subsidise the PDS, for example, Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat, Manipur, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, etc. Since State-wise
time series data on issue prices are not readily available, we take the
growth of the Central issue prices as representative at the State level
also. Again, the BPL-APL dual prices are not considered, as they are not
comparable with the earlier prices.
Each PDS Central issue price rise during the 1990s was so
prohibitively high (especially for common rice, see Table 8) that in no
State the increase in wage income, as compared with 1989-90, (Table
3), could initially catch up with it; this marks the three years, 1990-91,
1991-92 and 1994-95, exceptionally bad. Compare this result with the
general findings that rural poverty in India did increase in the initial
years of the 1990s and in 1994-95, as pointed out at the outset. The
results from the relative income growth (Table 5 and 6), explained above,
also corroborate this. There was no issue price revision in 1992-93, yet
only in 5 out of the 16 States could the wage increase outdo the earlier
price rise. The next year's price revision left only Kerala, Punjab and
Tamil Nadu unscathed. In 1995-96, however, only Kerala and Tamil
Nadu could keep their head above waters in the face of the previous
year's issue price revision; whereas in 1996-97, even with no price change,
7 of these States remained poor in income growth.
10 These fractions may be taken as representing the β values in equation (5).
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Comparative Dynamics
Given this grim scenario of wage income-food price growth
dynamics, it is now worth comparing this with the income-price growth
dynamics of the non-poor group, as captured in equation (5), which
explains the consumption changes of the poor in terms of the benefits to
the non-poor (β  – α). Note that from the definitions of the variables, we
have  )/( 12 pp =β ,  and )/( 12 yy =α .   Thus equation (5) actually
relates the consumption growth of the poor to the differential of price
inflation and income growth of the non-poor relative to those of the
poor. Quantification of this relationship is difficult for want of sufficient
data especially on the income growth of and price inflation facing
the non-poor; yet we can attempt at some rough estimation, as
below.
Let us identify the rural non-poor with the landlords, whose main
source of income is channeled to the crops marketed. The Central
Government's minimum support/procurement price (MSP) policy has
successfully set an effective floor price set to different crops; these prices
cover the paid out costs actually incurred by the farmers (Government
of India 1998: 167). The 1990s saw sharp rises in procurement prices;
for instance, the price of paddy increased by around 140 percent (2.4
times) by 1998-99 over 1989-90, and that of wheat, by 156 percent (Table
9). Thanks mainly to this trend, the terms of trade in general was more in
favour of the agricultural sector during the 1990s than during the 1980s
(Government of India 1998: 171). As already mentioned, the rise in
procurement price has also led to an exceptional increase in procurement;
for example, rice procurement increased from 7.73 lakh tonnes in 1989-
90 to 15.56 lakh tonnes in 1997-98, and wheat procurement from 8.94
lakh tonnes to 9.3 lakh tonnes during the same period, despite some
fluctuations in a few years. Now we postulate that the growth in the
income of the landlords from Government procurement of rice and wheat
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may be taken as a proxy for the income growth of the non-poor. In the
case of rice procurement, we use the procurement price of common paddy
in general in the estimation of the sales income.  We also account for the
fluctuations in the procurement by means of a three-year moving average.
The landlords’ income is thus estimated and its cumulative increase in
the 1990s over 1989-90 calculated (Table 9).  The cumulative price
inflation facing the landlords is taken as represented by that from the
general wholesale price index (WPI-all commodities), and reported in
Table 9. These together with the cumulative growth of agricultural wages
and CPI-AL provide the required proxy estimates of the income growth
ratio,  )/( 12 yy =α  , and the inflation ratio,  )/( 12 pp =β  , of the two
groups.  And we find the former greater than the latter during the whole
1990s. Thus the non-poor having benefited much more than the poor in
general (α > β), the consumption of the latter was bound to fall in this
period.
Rural Poverty Line Wage Rate
We have so far been considering the consumption prospects of the
poor in terms of rate of changes in their purchasing power, assuming
that its level is sufficient for their subsistence. Despite the legendary
difficulties in a proper quantification in this respect, we make a modest
attempt here in terms of a ‘rural poverty line wage rate’. Since the wages
are assumed to be the sole source of income of the agricultural
households, we need to examine whether the wage rate is sufficient to
meet the basic needs of an agricultural household and is thus consistent
with the poverty line. A ‘poverty line wage rate’ is a wage rate consistent
with the accepted poverty line that is enough to ensure the barest
minimum standard of life above the rural poverty line. The rural poverty
line wage rate (RPLW) is estimated for the 16 States for the period from
1989-90 to 1998-99, based on the official rural poverty line for
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1987-88, drawn at Rs. 7980 11 and the State-specific consumer price
index number for agricultural labourers (CPI-AL). Thus, assuming that
on average an agricultural worker with four dependents is employed for
25 days a month, the minimum RPLW corresponding to this official
rural poverty line for 1987-88 comes out to be Rs. 26.6 a day. This is
then adjusted for changes in the State-specific CPI-AL. For instance, for
Andhra Pradesh, the RPLW turns out to be Rs. 21.98 a day for 1987-88,
and for Kerala, Rs. 28.89. The RPLW increases over time in line with
the corresponding CPI-AL, the one for Andhra Pradesh to Rs. 61.14 by
1998-99, that for Kerala to Rs. 81.85, the maximum among the States,
and the all-India average to Rs. 72.19 a day. Table 10 presents the
estimated RPLW for the 16 States as well as the all-India average during
the period, based on the general assumption of a 5-member agricultural
family and 25 days’ work a month.12  Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Tamil
Nadu and West Bengal, with less than proportionate increase in the cost
11 The Planning Commission has defined the poverty line (PL) on the basis of the
nutritional requirements of 2435, rounded to 2400, calories per capita per day for
rural areas and 2095, rounded to 2100, calories for urban areas, as recommended
by the Expert Group on Estimation of Proportion and Number of Poor chaired by
Professor Lakadawala which accepted the PL of the Task Force on Minimum Needs
and Effective Consumption Demand. In rupee terms, the PL is the mid-point of the
expenditure class in which the calorie needs are satisfied. On this basis, the cut-off
points of monthly per capita expenditure turn out to be Rs. 49.09 in rural areas and
Rs. 56.64 in urban areas at 1973-74 prices. This has since then become the criterion
for estimating the number and proportion of the poor in India; at times the PL is
updated to allow for the changes in the prices affecting the cost of living of the
people around the PL. For a household of 5 members, the PL for 1987-88 has been
drawn at an annual income of  Rs. 7980 in rural and Rs. 9120 in urban areas.
(Reply to Unstarred Question No. 850 in Rajyasabha, March 20, 1990)
12 It should be noted that this latter assumption (of 25 days’ work a month for an
agricultural labourer) is highly questionable, it being far from the reality in most
of the States, and the RPLW estimated correspondingly might be a gross
underestimate. We however use it as the minimum wage rate required to be above
the poverty line, so that we can examine whether the actual wage rate is anywhere
near even this minimum one.
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of living, stand out with RPLW less than the all-India average for all/
most of the years.
Measure of Poverty Gap
Now comparing the nominal wage rate, obtained in these States
over time, with the corresponding RPLW, would drive home the message
on the extent of poverty among the agricultural workers. The comparison
would be clearer, if we use a measure of poverty gap (PG), defined here
as the deviation between the RPLW and the nominal wage (w) expressed
as a ratio of the former   (i.e., PG = 1 – w/RPLW). When w ≥ RPLW,
PG ≤ 0, suggesting an improvement in the standard of living; higher
values of PG, on the other hand, indicate a worsening situation. In the
former case, that is, when w ≥ RPLW, the ratio w/RPLW may be taken as
an indicator of the sufficient real income of the agricultural households.
Since the rate of change of RPLW is identical with that of the CPI-AL,
the percentage change of the sufficient real income corresponds to
equation (3), with y1 = w1 and p1 = CPI-AL. It is also easy to see that the
real wage growth rate is the negative of the growth rate of our poverty
gap estimates (given in Table 11), which in turn suggests that a decline
in real wages is a reflection of a rise in poverty gap. Thus, in Table 11,
we find that by 1998-99, only three States in India, Kerala, Haryana and
Himachal Pradesh, had a sufficient real income, that is, a nominal wage
rate higher than the RPLW; the agricultural wage rates in all other 13
States could not catch up with even the minimum possible poverty line
wage rate. In four of these States (Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa,
and Tamil Nadu) in 1989-90, agricultural wages were less than half of
the RPLW; only Orissa was left in this group by 1998-99. Never had this
State got an opening to improve its lot, (as evidenced also by the low
variability over time). It is significant to note that in 1989-90, on average
in India, the nominal agricultural wage rate was about 32.5 percent less
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than the RPLW; however, the gap has over time narrowed down to about
17 percent in 1998-99, through fluctuations.
As already found, Kerala, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh are the
only three States, where the nominal agricultural wages outstripped the
corresponding RPLW; the gap had been narrowing down at a faster rate
and became negative for Haryanan and Kerala by 1992-93 and for
Himachal Pradesh by 1996-97. Though Kerala had a fall back in 1993-
94, her surge has since then been phenomenal. Note that the poverty gap
for Punjab was negative for the five years of 1991-96, after which it
started to increase.
In short, in all States other than in Kerala, Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh, the nominal wage income of the agricultural workers as of 1998-
99 lay well below the RPLW, suggesting on average the extent of poverty
in India. The growth dynamics involved in the two competing forces of
wage income and inflation, which determines the RPLW, appears to be
too tardy to offer an improvement in many of these States in the near
future. This pessimistic message results from our estimates of the number
of years it would take since 1998-99 for the agricultural wages to catch
up with the RPLW, given the growth dynamics (Table 12). Thus, for
example, in the case of Andhra Pradesh, given the growth rates during
the period we consider of the wages of the agricultural workers and the
inflation facing them at 10.7 and 10.4 percent respectively, it would take,
since 1998-99, about 167 years for the wages to overtake the
corresponding RPLW; in other words, the present spell of poverty would
still reign for over 160 years in the State, other things remaining the
same.  Only in two States, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, with higher wage
growth potential, would such an overtaking be possible in the immediate
future. In Assam and Bihar, where the rural cost of living grows faster
than wage income, a catch up appears impossible. We also present two
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scenarios of desirable growth rates of wages required since 1998-99 to
catch up with the RPLW by a target year of 2020, assuming i) the same
CPI-AL growth rates as during the period considered; and ii) a 5 percent
growth rate of CPI-AL. These rates in turn depend on the magnitude of
PG in 1998-99 and the growth rate of wages. Obviously, Orissa,
Karnataka and Bihar need much bigger push.
4. Conclusion
‘The inflationary spiral’ that India witnessed in the initial years of
economic liberalisation was no doubt phenomenal. It peaked at 16.3 per
cent in WPI in September 1991, and at 16.1 percent in CPI for industrial
workers in January 1991, at 15.7 percent in CPI for urban non-manual
employees in September 1991 and at as high as 23.9 percent in CPI-AL
in May 1992. CPI-AL inflation was above 20 percent for eleven
successive months starting with September 1991, and was above 10
percent for almost the whole of 1991-1993. While the uptrend in inflation
was ‘primarily due to sharp increases in the prices of primary articles,
especially food grains and other food articles’ (Government of India
1992-93: 80), we find that there was no corresponding increases in the
incomes of those who spend mainly on these items, especially in the
case of agricultural labourers in general, during the inflationary period.
Besides being a pointer to the extent of poverty in India, this invalidates
the official claim (for example, Government of India 1993-94: 58) of
the ‘wage-price spiral’ also
On the other hand, the new inflation lavishly prospered a tiny island
of abundance. The rich farmers and landlords benefited from the rise in
the prices of primary articles much more than the loss in fertiliser subsidy
and liberalisation opened for them new vistas of ventures in agro-industry
and agro-exports. However, in spite of the increase in the incomes of
this group, inflation in the consumer durables and non-durables on which
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they spend more was less than the overall inflation. Thus, the liberalisation
seems to have compensated the non-poor much more than the poor for
their respective loss in purchasing power, and in a zero-sum game of
short run consumption, this implies that the non-poor stood to gain at
the cost of the poor.  Thus, delivered to the common man is a high-cost
life, upon which is going to be attained, if ever, a price stability, directed
by the free play13  of the market forces. Thus, the liberalisation appears
to be unleashing not (only) the market forces, but the fetters, though
kept loosely so far, on poverty.
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13 if at all allowed by the Government; see the last part in footnote no. 5.
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APPENDIX
 Price Changes and Implicit Subsidy
It goes without saying that a subsidised price (Ps) is necessarily
less than actual price (Pa) by the amount of subsidy (S): Ps < Pa. That is,
a subsidised price is obtained after deducting a certain amount of subsidy
from the actual price. That is, Ps = Pa – S. A subsidy cut raises Ps to Pa.
But what is subsidy?
It is always a certain percentage (s) of the actual price deducted
from it (actual price). That is, it is on the actual price that a subsidy is
declared. Thus S = s Pa, where s is the subsidy rate. Then Ps can be
written as Ps = Pa – s Pa = Pa (1 – s).
Now suppose price P 0 falls to P1, where the superscripts 0 and 1
refer to two consecutive periods. A price fall implies a subsidy provision.
Thus P0 refers to actual price (P0 = Pa), while P1 to subsidised price (P1
= Ps). Thus we have P1 = P0(1 – s). Then the percentage change (fall, or
deflation, in this case) is  sPPPP =−≡ 010 /)( , the rate of subsidy.
Also note that   SPPsP =−= 100 , the subsidy implied, where
P0 (= Pa) > P1 (= Ps).
Now consider the opposite case: price P0 rises to P1, where the
superscripts 0 and 1 refer to two consecutive periods, as earlier. A price
rise implies a subsidy cut. That is, P0 was a subsidised price (P0 = Ps).
But a subsidised price is defined with reference to an actual price only.
So, what was the actual price here? Since the subsidy cut raised the price
(from P0) to P1, we can reasonably assume that given the two price
levels, P1 was the actual price (P1 = Pa) when P0 was the subsidised
price. As Ps is defined in terms of Pa  undergoing a deduction,
[i.e., Ps = Pa  (1 – s)], we have P0 in terms of P1: i.e., P0 = P1(1 – s). With
these two price levels (where P0 < P1), the percentage increase in price
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(that is, inflation rate) is )1/(/)( 001 ssPPPP −=−≡ . Note here that
sP1  =  p1 – p0  = S,  the implied subsidy that was cut, where
P1 (= Pa) > P0 (= Ps)
It may be argued that we may have Pa = Ps (1 + s) or Ps = Pa – sPs,
that is, with the above example, )1(01 sPP += ,  so that it may be
shown that the percentage increase in price just equals the subsidy
rate, s: sPPPP =−≡ 001 /)( .  Here subsidy is determined with
reference to subsidised price (S = s Ps = s P0), which not only goes
wrong with the usual practice, but also is just impossible, as shown below:
The argument given earlier shows that a subsidised price
presupposes a subsidy, by which it remains lower, and a subsidy
presupposes an actual price, from which it (subsidy) is deducted. Thus
subsidisation is a sequence of three related events: first, there is an actual
price, then there is a subsidy (or subsidy rate), and then a subsidised
price, a result from the first two. That is, subsidy exists (is determined)
before the subsidised price. Hence the event S = s Ps,  i.e., subsidy being
determined with reference to the subsidised price, which implies that
subsidised price exists before subsidy is determined, is just impossible !
Hence the only reasonable relationship possible is Ps =  Pa(1 – s),
which yields the percentage increase in price  )1/( ssP −= , the forgone-
subsidy odds ratio.
30
cont'd
Table 1: Annual Inflation Rate and Relative Prices (Based on WPI)
Average Annual Inflation Rate (%)            Prices  Relative to General Price Level
1980s 1990s 1990s I 1990s II 1989-90 1995-96    1999-2000
All Commodities 6.52 8.07 10.14 5.04 1 1 1
Primary Articles 6.35 9.25 10.88 6.85 0.99 1.03 1.101
Food Articles 7.57 10.13 11.02 8.82 1.08 1.13 1.31
Food grains 6.46 10.79 11.26 10.1 0.996 1.06 1.28
Cereals 5.97 10.97 11.11 10.75 0.96 1.01 1.25
Rice 6.78 10.1 10.99 8.76 1.02 1.07 1.23
Wheat 5.02 11.91 10.61 13.9 0.89 0.92 1.27
Pulses 9.45 9.53 11.65 6.43 1.24 1.35 1.42
Fruits and Vegetables 6.9 9.83 11.29 7.67 1.03 1.09 1.21
Milk 9.13 7.47 7.7 7.12 1.21 1.06 1.15
Eggs, Fish & Meat 7.5 11.07 14.01 6.8 1.08 1.32 1.41
Non-Food Articles 6.54 7.93 11.66 2.58 1.002 1.09 0.99
Fuel, Power, Light & Lubricants 6.51 9.89 9.5 10.47 0.999 0.96 1.18
Coal Mining 11.09 8.33 7.99 8.84 1.4 1.24 1.43
Mineral Oils 3.33 10.65 10.37 11.06 0.78 0.79 0.99
Electricity 8.19 11.1 11.96 9.81 1.13 1.25 1.49
Manufactured Products 6.75 7.06 9.65 3.29 1.02 0.99 0.93
Food Products 6.48 8.49 9.1 7.57 0.998 0.94 1.04
Sugar, Khandsari & Gur 5.37 9.31 8.22 10.96 0.92 0.83 1.03
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Common Salt 5.17 13.82 19.26 6.12 0.903 1.46 1.52
Edible Oils 7.44 5.75 9.24 0.73 1.07 1.02 0.86
Textiles 5.9 4.8 10.92 -3.75 0.95 0.996 0.702
Fertilisers -0.13 10.12 13.44 5.32 0.597 0.71 0.72
Drugs and Medicines 4.33 11.86 8.99 16.3 0.85 0.795 1.196
Soaps & Detergents 5.59 9.16 8.44 10.25 0.93 0.85 1.03
Iron & Steel 8.27 6.06 7.46 3.98 1.14 0.98 0.94
Non-Ferrous Metals 11.71 6.48 8.59 3.4 1.46 1.34 1.26
Electricial Machinery 5.95 3.92 10.06 -4.65 0.96 0.95 0.65
CPI - Agricultural Labourers 7 9.21 10.62 7.11 1.03 1.71 1.39
CPI - Industrial Workers 8.75 9.48 10.39 8.14 1.14 1.83 1.52
CPI - Urban Non-Manual Employees 8.54 9.27 10.15 7.97 1.02 1.62 1.32
Note: 1980s = 1989-90 over 1981-82; 1990s = 1999-2000 over 1989-90; 1990s I = 1995-96 over 1989-90; 1990s II =
1999-2000 over 1995-96.
Average Annual Inflation Rate (%)            Prices  Relative to General Price Level
1980s 1990s 1990s I 1990s II 1989-90 1995-96    1999-2000
32Table 2: Average Agricultural Wage Rate (Rs./Day)
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99
Andhra Pradesh 17.01 18.42 21.14 24.5 26.07 29.89 32.53 36.42 39.98 42.29
Assam 21.71 25.08 27.19 29.72 30.66 32.95 36.37 39.24 42.78 48.2
Bihar 17.04 19.23 22.2 22.74 26.17 27.95 29.75 32.4 36.87 39.32
Gujarat 17.17 19.04 22.64 26.34 28.5 32.68 36.59 40.49 49.25 58.17
Haryana 31.93 35.15 41.75 50.12 55.62 60.87 65.3 74.76 82.61 92.34
Himachal Pradesh 27.64 29.4 34.03 39.53 42.89 51.7 57.77 71.16 86.07 86.07
Karnataka 15.02 15.51 16.84 16.79 22.29 21.81 22.69 29.19 35.45 38.15
Kerala 29.37 34.31 39.61 48.64 53.51 62.45 82.04 101.95 122.54 134.26
Madhya Pradesh 15.04 17.46 20.13 23.91 26.73 28.86 32.15 35.87 37.83 41.92
Maharashtra 17.58 20.12 22.86 23.82 28.82 35.74 35.91 36 45.38 46.26
Orissa 12.27 14.48 17.37 19.77 21.34 23.28 25.75 27.63 29.15 32.25
Punjab 31.7 37.11 43.33 48.12 57.31 61.51 61.79 65.81 71.5 76.41
Rajasthan 22.01 25.18 31.09 30.78 33.21 38.45 43.88 56.69 61.19 55.25
Tamil Nadu 13.9 14.15 17.57 21.76 25.13 29.48 34.52 39.53 45.34 51.29
Uttar Pradesh 18.69 21.34 25.15 26.92 29.52 31.83 38.72 42.85 49.06 54.76
West Bengal 24.05 25.86 28.16 35.6 37.07 37.71 41.68 45.5 53.74 61.9
All India (Average) 20.76 23.24 26.94 30.57 34.05 37.95 42.34 48.47 55.55 59.93
C V (%) 30.95 32.04 32.36 35.10 34.93 35.75 38.21 42.04 43.85 43.70
Note:  C V = Coefficient of Variation.
Source: Report of the Commission for agricultural Costs and Prices, various issues.
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Table 3:  Percentage Increase in Agricultural Wages over 1989-90
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Growth
Rate
 % p a
Andhra Pradesh 8.29 24.28 44.03 53.26 75.72 91.24 114.11 135.04 148.62 10.65
Assam 15.52 25.24 36.9 41.23 51.77 67.53 80.75 97.05 122.02 9.27
Bihar 12.85 30.28 33.45 53.58 64.03 74.59 90.14 116.37 130.75 9.74
Gujarat 10.89 31.86 53.41 65.99 90.33 113.1 135.82 186.84 238.79 14.52
Haryana 10.08 30.75 56.97 74.19 90.64 104.51 134.14 158.72 189.2 12.52
Himachal Pradesh 6.37 23.12 43.02 55.17 87.05 109.01 157.45 211.40 211.40 13.45
Karnataka 3.26 12.12 11.78 48.4 45.21 51.07 94.34 136.02 153.99 10.91
Kerala 16.82 34.87 65.61 82.19 112.63 179.33 247.12 317.23 357.13 18.40
Madhya Pradesh 16.09 33.84 58.98 77.73 91.89 113.76 138.5 151.53 178.72 12.06
Maharashtra 14.45 30.03 35.49 63.94 103.3 104.27 104.78 158.13 163.14 11.35
Orissa 18.01 41.56 61.12 73.92 89.73 109.86 125.18 137.57 162.84 11.33
Punjab 17.07 36.69 51.8 80.79 94.04 94.92 107.6 125.55 141.04 10.27
Rajasthan 14.4 41.25 39.85 50.89 58.34 99.36 157.56 178.01 151.02 10.77
Tamil Nadu 1.8 26.4 56.55 87.99 112.09 148.35 184.39 226.19 268.99 15.61
Uttar Pradesh 14.18 34.56 44.03 57.95 70.3 107.17 129.27 162.49 192.99 12.69
West Bengal 7.53 17.09 48.02 54.14 56.8 73.31 89.19 123.45 157.38 11.08
All India (Average) 11.96 29.79 47.25 64.04 82.81 103.97 133.49 167.59 188.69 12.50
C V (%) 42.15 26.97 28.29 21.90 25.54 29.45 31.59 31.85 31.92
Note: % p a = percentage per annum.
34Table 4:   Percentage Increase in CPI - AL over 1989-90
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Growth
Rate
 %  p a
Andhra Pradesh 7.18 38.83 58.40 55.14 73.25 91.84 111.58 122.35 143.72 10.40
Assam 9.91 30.50 41.83 55.08 71.17 85.07 95.24 107.59 135.52 9.99
Bihar 8.61 31.14 41.39 53.54 68.35 82.03 92.03 104.18 131.65 9.78
Gujarat 11.92 39.06 49.92 57.77 78.58 95.63 104.52 117.19 138.91 10.16
Haryana 12.59 26.39 35.11 57.99 72.15 82.57 102.66 113.68 135.47 9.98
Himachal Pradesh 12.59 26.39 35.11 57.99 72.15 82.57 102.66 113.68 135.47 9.98
Karnataka 6.32 33.07 50.72 45.59 68.77 94.86 103.56 110.94 134.39 9.93
Kerala 10.99 23.17 37.83 55.56 73.05 95.98 117.85 126.48 136.41 10.03
Madhya Pradesh 8.84 30.56 37.75 48.23 69.95 80.43 98.99 108.33 128.54 9.62
Maharashtra 7.09 42.78 47.86 42.65 77.81 99.73 100.27 107.75 127.67 9.57
Orissa 7.79 34.55 37.92 49.09 68.57 87.14 99.61 105.71 127.14 9.54
Punjab 12.59 26.39 35.11 57.99 72.15 82.57 102.66 113.68 135.47 9.98
Rajasthan 13.90 32.56 36.04 58.94 82.11 84.43 106.56 112.48 129.34 9.66
Tamil Nadu 8.29 29.83 41.85 46.96 70.44 92.13 104.42 107.18 128.18 9.60
Uttar Pradesh 18.67 38.44 37.82 62.05 78.86 89.86 115.33 118.29 142.89 10.36
West Bengal 14.56 33.06 35.24 50.61 61.77 79.86 92.52 102.04 140.41 10.24
All India (Average) 10.37 33.91 42.69 52.53 70.61 86.70 103.99 111.04 134.57 9.94
C V (%) 32.28 16.04 16.31 10.65 7.07 7.36 6.97 6.01 3.97
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Table 5:  Real Wage Rate of the Agricultural Workers (Rs./Day)
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Growth Average C V %
Rate % 1990s
 p.a.
Andhra Pradesh 2.77 2.8 2.48 2.52 2.74 2.81 2.77 2.81 2.93 2.83 0.22 2.74 5.35
Assam 2.79 2.94 2.68 2.7 2.54 2.48 2.53 2.59 2.65 2.63 -0.65 2.64 5.08
Bihar 2.16 2.24 2.14 2.04 2.16 2.1 2.07 2.14 2.29 2.15 -0.04 2.15 3.64
Gujarat 2.59 2.57 2.46 2.65 2.72 2.76 2.82 2.99 3.42 3.67 3.96 2.9 13.94
Haryana 3.87 3.78 4 4.49 4.26 4.28 4.33 4.47 4.68 4.75 2.31 4.34 7.11
Himachal Pradesh 3.35 3.16 3.26 3.54 3.29 3.64 3.83 4.25 4.88 4.43 3.15 3.81 15.57
Karnataka 1.98 1.92 1.67 1.47 2.02 1.7 1.53 1.89 2.21 2.14 0.9 1.84 14.31
Kerala 3.47 3.65 3.8 4.17 4.07 4.27 4.95 5.53 6.4 6.71 7.6 4.84 23.43
Madhya Pradesh 1.9 2.03 1.95 2.19 2.28 2.14 2.25 2.28 2.29 2.32 2.23 2.19 5.89
Maharashtra 2.35 2.51 2.14 2.15 2.7 2.69 2.4 2.4 2.92 2.72 1.62 2.52 10.56
Orissa 1.59 1.74 1.68 1.86 1.86 1.79 1.79 1.8 1.84 1.84 1.63 1.8 3.36
Punjab 3.84 3.99 4.15 4.31 4.39 4.33 4.1 3.93 4.05 3.93 0.26 4.13 4.25
Rajasthan 2.83 2.85 3.02 2.91 2.69 2.72 3.06 3.53 3.71 3.1 1.01 3.06 11.34
Tamil Nadu 1.92 1.8 1.87 2.12 2.36 2.39 2.48 2.67 3.02 3.1 5.49 2.42 18.87
Uttar Pradesh 2.31 2.22 2.25 2.41 2.25 2.2 2.52 2.46 2.78 2.79 2.11 2.43 9.42
West Bengal 3.27 3.07 2.88 3.58 3.35 3.17 3.15 3.22 3.62 3.5 0.76 3.28 7.59
All India (Average) 2.76 2.8 2.68 2.85 2.97 2.96 3.02 3.16 3.5 3.4 2.33 3.04 8.97
C V (%) 25.78 25.16 30.09 32.61 26.86 29.3 31.54 32.87 33.94 36.19 29.94
36)/( 11 py Table 6:   Growth of Agricultural Wages Relative to Growth of CPI-AL  over 1989-90
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Average CV %
Andhra Pradesh 1.15 0.63 0.75 0.97 1.03 0.99 1.02 1.10 1.03 0.97 17.52
Assam 1.57 0.83 0.88 0.75 0.73 0.79 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.91 27.86
Bihar 1.49 0.97 0.81 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.98 1.12 0.99 1.02 18.99
Gujarat 0.91 0.82 1.07 1.14 1.15 1.18 1.30 1.59 1.72 1.21 24.22
Haryana 0.80 1.17 1.62 1.28 1.26 1.27 1.31 1.40 1.40 1.28 17.27
Himachal Pradesh 0.51 0.88 1.23 0.95 1.21 1.32 1.53 1.86 1.56 1.23 33.29
Karnataka 0.52 0.37 0.23 1.06 0.66 0.54 0.91 1.23 1.15 0.74 48.50
Kerala 1.53 1.51 1.73 1.48 1.54 1.87 2.10 2.51 2.62 1.88 23.43
Madhya Pradesh 1.82 1.11 1.56 1.61 1.31 1.41 1.40 1.40 1.39 1.45 13.87
Maharashtra 2.04 0.70 0.74 1.50 1.33 1.05 1.05 1.47 1.28 1.24 33.55
Orissa 2.31 1.20 1.61 1.51 1.31 1.26 1.26 1.30 1.28 1.45 24.11
Punjab 1.36 1.39 1.48 1.39 1.30 1.15 1.05 1.10 1.04 1.25 13.27
Rajasthan 1.04 1.27 1.11 0.86 0.71 1.18 1.48 1.58 1.17 1.15 23.72
Tamil Nadu 0.22 0.88 1.35 1.87 1.59 1.61 1.77 2.11 2.10 1.50 40.87
Uttar Pradesh 0.76 0.90 1.16 0.93 0.89 1.19 1.12 1.37 1.35 1.08 20.06
West Bengal 0.52 0.52 1.36 1.07 0.92 0.92 0.96 1.21 1.12 0.96 30.02
All India (Average) 1.15 0.88 1.11 1.22 1.17 1.20 1.28 1.51 1.40 1.21 14.77
CV (%) 52.52 35.73 36.90 26.02 24.57 26.38 26.43 27.34 31.89 22.70
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Table 7: Subsidy Cuts Implied in CPI-AL Inflation Over 1989-90
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Growth
     Rate % pa
Andhra Pradesh 0.067 0.28 0.369 0.355 0.423 0.479 0.527 0.55 0.59 31.25
Assam 0.09 0.234 0.295 0.355 0.416 0.46 0.488 0.518 0.575 26.07
Bihar 0.079 0.237 0.293 0.349 0.406 0.451 0.479 0.51 0.568 27.92
Gujarat 0.106 0.281 0.333 0.366 0.44 0.489 0.511 0.54 0.581 23.64
Haryana 0.112 0.209 0.26 0.367 0.419 0.452 0.507 0.532 0.575 22.72
Himachal Pradesh 0.112 0.209 0.26 0.367 0.419 0.452 0.507 0.532 0.575 22.72
Karnataka 0.059 0.249 0.337 0.313 0.407 0.487 0.509 0.526 0.573 32.74
Kerala 0.099 0.188 0.274 0.357 0.422 0.49 0.541 0.558 0.577 24.64
Madhya Pradesh 0.081 0.234 0.274 0.325 0.412 0.446 0.497 0.52 0.562 27.37
Maharashtra 0.066 0.3 0.324 0.299 0.438 0.499 0.501 0.519 0.561 30.62
Orissa 0.072 0.257 0.275 0.329 0.407 0.466 0.499 0.514 0.56 29.16
Punjab 0.112 0.209 0.26 0.367 0.419 0.452 0.507 0.532 0.575 22.72
Rajasthan 0.122 0.246 0.265 0.371 0.451 0.458 0.516 0.529 0.564 21.09
Tamil Nadu 0.077 0.23 0.295 0.32 0.413 0.48 0.511 0.517 0.562 28.3
Uttar Pradesh 0.157 0.278 0.274 0.383 0.441 0.473 0.536 0.542 0.588 17.93
West Bengal 0.127 0.248 0.261 0.336 0.382 0.444 0.481 0.505 0.584 21
All India (Average) 0.094 0.253 0.299 0.344 0.414 0.464 0.51 0.526 0.574 25.37
C V (%) 28.57 12.21 11.11 7.03 4.06 3.85 3.41 2.78 1.69
38Table 8: Procurement Prices  and PDS Issue Prices
1989-90 1990-91  1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 Growth
Rate% p.a
Procurement Prices (Rs./quintal)
Paddy: Common 185 205 230 270 310 340 360 380 415 440 490 10.23
         Fine 195 215 240 280 330 360 375 395 445 470 520 10.31
Super Fine 205 225 250 290 350 380 395 415 10.6
Wheat 215 225 275 330 350 360 380 475 510 550 550 9.85
Percentage Increase over 1989-90
Rice: Common 10.81 24.32 45.95 67.57 83.78 94.59 105.41 124.32 137.84 164.86
         Fine 10.26 23.08 43.59 69.23 84.62 92.31 102.56 128.21 141.03 166.67
        Super Fine 9.76 21.95 41.46 70.73 85.37 92.68 102.44
Wheat 4.65 27.91 53.49 62.79 67.44 76.74 120.93 137.21 155.81 155.81
PDS Issue Prices (Rs./quintal)
Rice: Common 244 289 377 377 437 537 537 537 11.93
         Fine 304 349 437 437 497 617 617 617 10.64
        Super Fine 325 370 458 458 518 648 648 648 10.36
Wheat 204 234 280 280 330 402 402 402 10.18
Percentage Increase over 1989-90
Rice: Common 18.44 54.51 54.51 79.10 120.08 120.08 120.08
         Fine 14.80 43.75 43.75 63.49 102.96 102.96 102.96
        Super Fine 13.85 40.92 40.92 59.38 99.38 99.38 99.38
Wheat 14.71 37.25 37.25 61.76 97.06 97.06 97.06
Implied Subsidy Cut over 1989-90, (%)
Rice: Common 15.57 35.28 35.28 44.16 54.56 54.56 54.56
         Fine 12.89 30.43 30.43 38.83 50.73 50.73 50.73
        Super Fine 12.16 29.04 29.04 37.26 49.85 49.85 49.85
Wheat 12.82 27.14 27.14 38.18 49.25 49.25 49.25
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Table 9: Growth Dynamics of Income and Price of the Poor vis-à-vis the Non-Poor
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-
2000
Procurement Price(Rs. / Quintal)
    Rice Common 185 205 230 270 310 340 360 380 415 440 490
    Wheat 183 215 225 275 330 350 360 380 475 510 550
Procurement (‘000 Tonnes)*
    Rice Common 10754 11595 11993 12522 13673 12671 12237 12855 13684 15432 17187.67
    Wheat 8863 9253.7 8399.7 8989.3 10361 12344 10793 9936 10044 12031 14383.33
Income from Sales  ( Rs. Crores)
    Rice Common 1989.5 2377.0 2758.3 3381.0 4238.5 4308.0 4405.4 4884.9 5678.7 6790.2 8422.0
    Wheat 1621.9 1989.5 1889.9 2472.1 3419.2 4320.3 3885.5 3775.7 4770.9 6135.6 7910.8
    Total 3611.4 4366.6 4648.2 5853.1 7657.8 8628.3 8290.9 8660.6 10449.6 12925.9 16332.8
Cumulative increase (%) over 1989-90 in
       Landlords’ Income 20.91 28.71 62.07 112.04 138.92 129.58 139.81 189.35 257.92 352.25
      Agricultural Wages 11.96 29.79 47.25 64.04 82.81 103.97 133.49 167.59 188.69 199.28
      WPI All Commodities 10.26 25.41 38.01 49.54 68.39 81.85 90.22 98.59 110.41 117.29
      CPI - AL 10.37 33.91 42.69 52.53 70.61 86.70 103.99 111.04 134.57 139.63
Alpha 1.75 0.96 1.31 1.75 1.68 1.25 1.05 1.13 1.37 1.77
Beta 0.989 0.749 0.891 0.943 0.968 0.944 0.868 0.888 0.820 0.840
Note: * = 3-year moving average
40Table 10:  Estimated Poverty Line Wage Rates in Agriculture (assuming 25 days work in a month)
1987-88 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99   1999-2000
Andhra Pradesh 21.98 25.09 26.89 34.83 39.74 38.92 43.46 48.13 53.08 55.78 61.14 63.06
Assam 27.17 31.80 34.95 41.50 45.10 49.31 54.43 58.85 62.08 66.01 74.89 78.04
Bihar 28.28 32.33 35.11 42.40 45.71 49.64 54.43 58.85 62.08 66.01 74.89 76.49
Gujarat 24.43 27.13 30.36 37.73 40.68 42.81 48.45 53.08 55.49 58.93 64.82 67.65
Haryana 27.95 33.80 38.06 42.72 45.67 53.40 58.19 61.71 68.51 72.23 79.60 81.44
Himachal Pradesh 27.95 33.80 38.06 42.72 45.67 53.40 58.19 61.71 68.51 72.23 79.60 81.44
Karnataka 25.29 31.06 33.02 41.33 46.82 45.22 52.42 60.53 63.23 65.52 72.80 75.22
Kerala 28.89 34.62 38.43 42.64 47.72 53.85 59.91 67.85 75.42 78.41 81.85 83.85
Madhya Pradesh 26.72 32.41 35.28 42.31 44.65 48.04 55.08 58.48 64.49 67.52 74.07 77.34
Maharashtra 25.90 30.61 32.78 43.71 45.26 43.66 54.43 61.14 61.30 63.59 69.69 72.68
Orissa 29.38 31.51 33.97 42.40 43.46 46.98 53.12 58.97 62.90 64.82 71.57 78.12
Punjab 27.95 33.80 38.06 42.72 45.67 53.40 58.19 61.71 68.51 72.23 79.60 81.44
Rajasthan 27.17 31.80 36.22 42.15 43.26 50.54 57.91 58.64 65.68 67.56 72.92 78.00
Tamil Nadu 26.07 29.63 32.08 38.47 42.03 43.54 50.50 56.92 60.57 61.38 67.60 70.02
Uttar Pradesh 28.85 33.11 39.29 45.83 45.63 53.65 59.22 62.86 71.29 72.27 80.41 82.87
West Bengal 26.60 30.08 34.46 40.02 40.68 45.30 48.66 54.10 57.91 60.77 72.31 71.12
All India (Average) 26.60 30.77 33.97 41.21 43.91 46.94 52.50 57.46 62.78 64.94 72.19 73.74
C V (%) 7.14 8.24 9.77 6.34 5.36 9.96 8.76 7.84 9.23 9.06 8.13 7.98
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Table 11: The Minimum Income Gap of Poverty
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 Average C V (%)
Andhra Pradesh 0.322 0.315 0.393 0.383 0.330 0.312 0.324 0.314 0.283 0.308 0.329 10.33
Assam 0.317 0.282 0.345 0.341 0.378 0.395 0.382 0.368 0.352 0.356 0.352 9.43
Bihar 0.473 0.452 0.476 0.503 0.473 0.486 0.494 0.478 0.441 0.475 0.475 3.80
Gujarat 0.367 0.373 0.400 0.352 0.334 0.326 0.311 0.270 0.164 0.103 0.300 31.97
Haryana 0.055 0.076 0.023 -0.097 -0.041 -0.046 -0.058 -0.091 -0.144 -0.160 -0.048 -165.11
Himachal Pradesh 0.182 0.228 0.203 0.134 0.197 0.112 0.064 -0.039 -0.192 -0.081 0.081 174.59
Karnataka 0.516 0.530 0.593 0.641 0.507 0.584 0.625 0.538 0.459 0.475 0.547 11.27
Kerala 0.152 0.107 0.071 -0.019 0.006 -0.042 -0.209 -0.352 -0.563 -0.641 -0.149 -189.12
Madhya Pradesh 0.536 0.505 0.524 0.464 0.444 0.476 0.450 0.444 0.440 0.434 0.472 7.91
Maharashtra 0.426 0.386 0.477 0.474 0.340 0.343 0.413 0.413 0.286 0.326 0.388 16.36
Orissa 0.611 0.574 0.590 0.545 0.546 0.562 0.563 0.561 0.550 0.548 0.565 3.78
Punjab 0.062 0.025 -0.014 -0.054 -0.073 -0.057 -0.001 0.039 0.010 0.040 -0.002 -2047.75
Rajasthan 0.308 0.305 0.262 0.288 0.343 0.336 0.252 0.137 0.094 0.240 0.256 32.02
Tamil Nadu 0.531 0.559 0.543 0.482 0.423 0.416 0.394 0.347 0.261 0.241 0.420 26.78
Uttar Pradesh 0.435 0.457 0.451 0.410 0.450 0.462 0.384 0.399 0.321 0.319 0.409 13.10
West Bengal 0.200 0.250 0.296 0.125 0.182 0.225 0.230 0.214 0.116 0.144 0.198 28.97
All India (Average) 0.325 0.316 0.346 0.304 0.275 0.277 0.263 0.228 0.145 0.170 0.265 25.01
C V (%) 53.44 54.51 56.81 74.70 70.98 76.39 88.36 111.35 200.60 176.65 81.60
42Table 12: Number of Years for the Agricultural Wages to Equal Poverty Line Wages Since 1998-99
Growth rate % p. a.         1998-99 Catch-up Desired Growth of Wages
Wages CPI - AL Wages PL Wages Period (yrs) 1 2
Andhra Pradesh 10.65 10.40 42.29 61.14 166.7 12.46 6.95
Assam 9.27 9.99 48.2 74.89 NP 12.44 7.34
Bihar 9.74 9.78 39.32 74.89 NP 13.38 8.44
Gujarat 14.52 10.16 58.17 64.82 2.8 10.76 5.57
Haryana 12.52 9.98 92.34 79.60 NA NA NA
Himachal Pradesh 13.45 9.98 86.07 79.60 NA 9.55 4.59
Karnataka 10.93 9.93 38.19 72.80 71.3 13.53 8.44
Kerala 18.40 10.03 134.27 81.85 NA NA NA
 Madhya Pradesh 12.06 9.62 41.9 74.07 25.9 12.79 8.03
Maharashtra 11.54 9.57 46.96 69.69 22.2 11.76 7.09
Orissa 11.37 9.54 32.35 71.57 48.0 13.98 9.25
Punjab 10.27 9.98 76.41 79.60 15.7 10.21 5.21
 Rajasthan 10.81 9.66 55.45 72.92 26.2 11.17 6.45
 Tamil Nadu 15.61 9.60 51.29 67.60 5.2 11.12 6.46
Uttar Pradesh 12.69 10.36 54.76 80.41 18.4 12.50 7.04
West Bengal 11.08 10.24 61.9 72.31 20.5 11.10 5.82
All India (Average) 12.50 9.94 59.93 72.19 8.1 10.96 5.98
NA = Not Applicable; NP = Not Possible
1 = at the given growth rate of CPI - AL, to reach PLW since 1999-2000 by 2020;
2 = at a minimum 5 % growth rate of CPI - AL
43
REFERENCES
Datt, G. (1999) ‘Has Poverty Declined since Economic Reforms?’,
Economic and Political Weekly, December 11: 3516-18.
Dev, M. S., and Ranade, A. (1997) ‘Rising Food Prices and Rural
Poverty’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIII, No. 39:
2529-36.
Ghosh, A. (2000) ‘Whither the Trickle-Down Effect of Growth?’,
Business Line, March 21.
Government of India (1991–92 ) Economic Survey 1991–92, Ministry
of Finance, New Delhi.
Government of India (1992–93 ) Economic Survey 1992–93, Ministry
of Finance, New Delhi.
Government of India (1993–94 ) Economic Survey 1993–94, Ministry
of Finance, New Delhi.
Government of India (1998) Reports of the Commission for Agricultural
Costs and Prices for the Crops Sown During 1998-99 Season,
Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi.
Hamilton, E. (1952) ‘Prices as a Factor in Business Growth – Prices and
Progress’, Journal of Economic History, Fall, Vol. XII (4):
325 – 349.
Jha, R. (1999) ‘Reducing Poverty and Inequality in India: Has
Liberalisation Helped?’, mimeo, Indira Gandhi Institute of
Development research, Mumbai, December.
Joshi, V. and Little, I. M. D. (1997) ‘The Social Sectors, Poverty and
Reform’, in India’s Economic Reforms, Oxford University Press,
Delhi: 219 – 43.
Keynes, J. M. (1930) ‘A Treatise on Money’ in ‘The Collected Writings
of John Maynard Keynes’ 1971, Vol. V and VI, Macmillan.
Maheshwari, A. (2002) ‘Economic Reforms and Rural Poverty’,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37 (17), May 3: 1676 – 85.
44
Mahmud, Wahiduddin (Ed.) (2001) Adjustment and Beyond: The Reform
Experience in South Asia, Palgrave, London.
Nayyar, Deepak (1998) ‘Macroeconomic Reforms in India – Short Term
Effects and Long Run Implications’, DSA Working Paper 05/98
(mimeo), Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi; reprinted in Mahmud 2001: 20 – 46.
Pant, D. K. and Patra, K. (2001) ‘Rural Poverty in India in the Early
1990s’, Margin, Vol. 33 (2 & 3), January-March & April-June:
66 – 91.
Patnaik, U. (1999) ‘Export-Oriented Agriculture and Food Security in
Developing Countries and in India’, in The Long Transition,
Tulika, New Delhi: 351 – 417.
Radhakrishna R. and Ravi, C. (1992) ‘Does Inflation hurt the Poor More?’
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27 (4), January 25: 157 – 9.
Ravallion, M. (1998) ‘Reforms, Food Prices and Poverty in India’,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33 (1 & 2).
Sen, Abhijit (1996) ‘Economic Reforms, Employment and Poverty –
Trends and Options’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31,
Special Number: 2459 – 77.
Sen, Abhijit (1997) ‘Structural Adjustment and Rural Poverty’ in Chadha,
G. K. and Sharma A. N. (ed.), Growth, Employment and Poverty:
Change and Continuity in Rural India, Vikas Publishing House,
Delhi.
Tendulkar, S. (1998) ‘Indian Economic Policy Reforms and Poverty:
An Assessment’, in Ahluwalia, I. And Little, I. M. D. (eds.), India’s
Economic Reforms and Developments, Oxford University Press,
New Delhi.
Tendulkar, S., Sundaram, S. K. and Jain, L. R. (1993) ‘Poverty in India,
1970-71 to 1988-89’, ARTEP Working Paper, ILO, New Delhi,
December.
45
 CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
LIST OF WORKING PAPERS
[New Series]
The Working Paper Series was initiated in 1971.   A new series was
started in 1996  from WP. 270 onwards. Working papers beginning from
279 can  be downloaded from the Centre's website (www.cds.edu)
W.P. 355 P.L.BEENA Towards  Understanding the Merger-Wave in the
Indian Corporate Sector: A Comparative Perspective, January
2004.
W.P. 354 K.P. KANNAN AND R. MOHAN India’s Twelfth Finance
Commission  A View from Kerala, December  2003.
W.P. 353 K.N. HARILAL AND P.L. BEENA  The WTO Agreement on
Rules of Origin Implications for South Asia, December  2003.
W.P. 352 K. PUSHPANGADAN  Drinking Water and Well-being In India:
Data Envelopment Analysis, October  2003.
W.P. 351 INDRANI CHAKRABORTY  Liberalization  of  Capital
Inflows  and  the Real Exchange Rate in India : A  VAR  Analysis,
September 2003.
W.P. 350 M.KABIR Beyond Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation’s
Public Health Intervention in Thiruvithamkoor, 1929-1939,
September 2003.
W.P. 349 JOHN KURIEN  The Blessing of the Commons : Small-Scale
Fisheries, Community Property Rights, and Coastal Natural
Assets, August  2003.
W.P. 348 MRIDUL EAPEN,   Rural Industrialisation in Kerala: Re-
Examining the Issue of Rural Growth Linkages,  July 2003.
W.P. 347 RAKHE PB, Estimation of Tax Leakage and its Impact
on Fiscal Health in Kerala, July 2003.
W.P. 346 VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI N, A contribution to Peak load
pricing theory and Application. April 2003.
W.P. 345 V.K. RAMACHANDRAN, MADHURA SWAMINATHAN,
VIKAS RAWAL Barriers to Expansion of Mass Literacy and
Primary Schooling in West Bengal: Study Based on Primary Data
from Selected Villages. April  2003.
W.P. 344 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA  Rights-Based Strategies in the
Prevention of Domestic Violence,  March 2003.
46
W.P. 343 K. PUSHPANGADAN Remittances, Consumption and
Economic growth in Kerala: 1980-2000, March 2003.
W.P.  342 D NARAYANA  Why is the Credit-deposit Ratio Low in Kerala?
January  2003.
W.P.  341 MRIDUL EAPEN,  PRAVEENA KODOTH Family Structure,
Women’s Education and Work:  Re-examining the High  Status
of Women in Kerala. November  2002.
W.P.  340 J. DEVIKA,  Domesticating Malayalees: Family Planning,
the Nation and Home-Centered   Anxieties in Mid- 20th Century
Keralam. October, 2002.
W.P.  339 M PARAMESWARAN, Economic Reforms and Technical
Efficiency: Firm Level Evidence from Selected Industries in
India. October, 2002.
W.P.  338 PRAVEENA KODOTH, Framing Custom, Directing
Practices: Authority, Property and Matriliny under Colonial
Law in Nineteenth Century Malabar,  October 2002.
W.P.  337 K.NAVANEETHAM, Age Structural Transition and Economic
Growth: Evidence  From South and Southeast Asia, August   2002.
W.P.  336 PULAPRE BALAKRISHNAN, K. PUSHPANGADAN,
M.  SURESH BABU,  Trade Liberalisation, Market Power and
Scale Efficiency in Indian Industry, August 2002.
W.P.  335 J. DEVIKA, Family  Planning  as  ‘Liberation’:  The  Ambiguities
of ‘Emancipation from  Biology’  in  Keralam  July 2002.
W.P.  334 E. ABDUL AZEEZ,  Economic Reforms and Industrial
Performance an Analysis of Capacity Utilisation in Indian
Manufacturing,  June 2002.
W.P.  333 K. PUSHPANGADAN Social Returns from Drinking Water,
Sanitation and Hygiene Education: A Case Study of Two Coastal
Villages in Kerala, May 2002.
W.P.  332 K. P. KANNAN,  The Welfare Fund Model  of Social Security
for Informal Sector Workers: The Kerala  Experience.
April 2002.
W.P.  331 SURESH BABU,  Economic Reforms and Entry Barriers in
Indian Manufacturing. April 2002.
W.P.  330 ACHIN CHAKRABORTY,  The Rhetoric of Disagreement in
Reform Debates April 2002.
47
W.P.  329 J. DEVIKA, Imagining Women's Social Space in Early Modern
Keralam. April 2002.
W.P.  328 K. P. KANNAN,  K. S. HARI,  Kerala's Gulf Connection
Emigration, Remittances and their Macroeconomic Impact 1972-
2000. March 2002.
W.P.  327 K. RAVI RAMAN,  Bondage in Freedom, Colonial Plantations
in Southern India c. 1797-1947.  March 2002.
W.P.  326 K.C. ZACHARIAH, B.A. PRAKASH, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN,
Gulf Migration Study : Employment, Wages and Working
Conditions of Kerala Emigrants in the United Arab Emirates.
March 2002.
W.P.  325 N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI,   Reliability and Rationing
cost in a Power System. March 2002.
W.P.  324 K. P. KANNAN, N. VIJAYAMOHANAN  PILLAI, The
Aetiology  of the Inefficiency Syndrome  in the Indian Power Sector
Main Issues and Conclusions of a Study.  March 2002.
W.P.  323 V. K. RAMACHANDRAN,  MADHURA SWAMINATHAN,
VIKAS RAWAL, How have Hired Workers Fared? A Case Study
of Women Workers from an Indian Village, 1977 to 1999.
December 2001.
W.P.  322 K. C. ZACHARIAH, The Syrian Christians of Kerala:
Demographic and  Socioeconomic Transition in the Twentieth
Century, November  2001.
W.P.  321 VEERAMANI C.  Analysing Trade Flows and Industrial
Structure of India: The Question of Data Harmonisation,
November  2001.
W.P.  320 N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI, K. P. KANNAN, Time and
Cost Over-runs of the Power Projects in Kerala,  November  2001.
W.P.  319 K. C. ZACHARIAH, P. R. GOPINATHAN NAIR,
S. IRUDAYA- RAJAN  Return Emigrants in Kerala:
Rehabilitation Problems and Development Potential. October
2001
W.P.  318 JOHN KURIEN,  ANTONYTO PAUL Social Security Nets
for Marine Fisheries-The growth and Changing Composition of
Social Security Programmes in the Fisheries Sector of Kerala
State, India. September  2001.
48
W.P.  317 K. J. JOSEPH,  K. N. HARILAL India's IT  Export Boom:
Challenges Ahead. July  2001.
W.P.  316 K. P. KANNAN,  N. VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI The
Political Economy of Public Utilities: A Study of the Indian Power
Sector, June  2001.
W.P.  315 ACHIN CHAKRABORTYThe Concept and Measurement of
Group Inequality, May  2001.
W.P.  314 U.S.MISHRA, MALA RAMANATHAN Delivery Compli-cations
and Determinants of Caesarean Section Rates in India - An Analysis
of National Family Health Surveys, 1992-93, March 2001.
W.P.  313 VEERAMANI. C  India's Intra-Industry Trade Under Economic
Liberalization: Trends and Country Specific Factors, March 2001
W.P.  312 N. VIJAYAMOHANAN  PILLAI  Electricity Demand Analysis
and Forecasting –The Tradition is Questioned, February 2001
W.P.  311 INDRANI CHAKRABORTY Economic Reforms, Capital Inflows
and Macro Economic Impact in India,  January 2001
W.P.  310 K. K. SUBRAHMANIAN. E. ABDUL AZEEZ, Industrial Growth
In Kerala:  Trends And Explanations November  2000
W.P.  309 V. SANTHAKUMAR, ACHIN CHAKRABORTY, Environmental
Valuation and its Implications on the Costs and Benefits of a
Hydroelectric Project in  Kerala, India, November 2000.
W.P.  308 K. P. KANNAN, N . VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI, Plight of the
Power Sector in India : SEBs and their Saga  of Inefficiency
November  2000.
W.P. 307  K. NAVANEETHAM, A. DHARMALINGAM, Utilization of
Maternal Health Care Services in South India, October 2000.
W.P.  306 S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, Home Away From Home: A Survey of Oldage
Homes and inmates in Kerala, August 2000.
W.P.  305 K. N. HARILAL, K.J. JOSEPH, Stagnation and Revival of Kerala
Economy: An Open Economy Perspective, August 2000.
W.P.  304 K. P. KANNAN, Food Security in a Regional Perspective; A View
from 'Food Deficit' Kerala, July 2000.
W.P.  303 K. C. ZACHARIAH,  E. T. MATHEW,  S. IRUDAYA RAJAN ,
Socio-Economic and Demographic Consequenes of Migration in
Kerala, May 2000.
W.P.  302 K. PUSHPANGADAN, G. MURUGAN, Gender Bias in a
Marginalised Community: A Study of Fisherfolk in Coastal Kerala,
May 2000.
49
W.P.  301 P. L. BEENA  An Analysis of Mergers in the Private Corporate
Sector in India, March, 2000.
W.P.  300 D. NARAYANA  Banking Sector Reforms and the Emerging
Inequalities in Commercial Credit Deployment in India, March, 2000.
W.P.  299 JOHN KURIEN Factoring  Social and Cultural  Dimensions  into
Food and Livelihood  Security  Issues of  Marine Fisheries;  A Case
Study of Kerala State, India, February, 2000.
W.P.  298 D. NARAYANA, K. K. HARI KURUP, Decentralisation of the
Health Care Sector in Kerala : Some Issues, January, 2000.
W.P.  297 K.C. ZACHARIAH, E. T. MATHEW, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN
Impact of Migration on Kerala's Economy and Society, July, 1999.
W.P.  296 P.K. MICHAEL THARAKAN ,  K. NAVANEETHAM Population
Projection and Policy Implications for Education:A Discussion with
Reference to Kerala, July, 1999.
W.P.  295 N. SHANTA,  J. DENNIS RAJA KUMAR Corporate Statistics:
The Missing Numbers, May, 1999.
W.P.  294 K. P. KANNAN  Poverty Alleviation as Advancing Basic  Human
Capabilities: Kerala's Achievements Compared, May, 1999.
W.P.  293 MRIDUL EAPEN  Economic  Diversification In Kerala : A  Spa-
tial  Analysis, April, 1999.
W.P.  292 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA  Poverty and young Women's Em-
ployment: Linkages in Kerala, February, 1999.
W.P.  291 P. K. MICHAEL THARAKAN  Coffee, Tea or Pepper? Factors
Affecting Choice of Crops by Agro-Entrepreneurs in  Nineteenth  Cen-
tury South-West India, November 1998
W.P.  290 CHRISTOPHE Z. GUILMOTO, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN Regional
Heterogeneity and Fertility Behaviour in India,  November 1998.
W.P.  289 JOHN KURIEN Small Scale Fisheries in the Context of
Globalisation,  October 1998.
W.P.  288 S. SUDHA, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN Intensifying Masculinity of Sex
Ratios in India : New Evidence 1981-1991, May 1998.
W.P.  287 K. PUSHPANGADAN, G. MURUGAN Pricing  with Changing
Welfare Criterion: An Application of  Ramsey- Wilson Model to Ur-
ban Water Supply,  March 1998.
W.P.  286 ACHIN CHAKRABORTY The Irrelevance of Methodology and
the Art of the Possible : Reading Sen and Hirschman, February 1998.
W.P.  285 V. SANTHAKUMAR  Inefficiency and Institutional Issues in the
Provision of Merit Goods, February 1998.
50
W.P.  284 K. P. KANNAN  Political Economy of Labour and Development in
Kerala,  January 1998.
W.P.  283 INDRANI CHAKRABORTY  Living Standard and Economic
Growth: A fresh Look at the Relationship Through the Non- Para-
metric Approach, October 1997.
W.P.  282 S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, K. C. ZACHARIAH Long Term Implica-
tions of Low Fertility in Kerala, October 1997.
W.P.  281 SUNIL MANI   Government Intervention in Industrial R & D, Some
Lessons from the International Experience for India,  August 1997.
W.P.  280 PRADEEP  KUMAR PANDA  Female Headship, Poverty and Child
Welfare : A Study of Rural Orissa, India,  August 1997.
W.P.  279 U.S. MISRA, MALA RAMANATHAN, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN
Induced Abortion Potential Among Indian Women,  August 1997.
W. P. 278 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA The Effects of Safe Drinking Water
and Sanitation on Diarrhoeal Diseases Among Children in Rural
Orissa, May 1997.
W. P. 277 PRADEEP KUMAR PANDA  Living Arrangements of the Elderly
in Rural Orissa,  May 1997.
W. P. 276 V. SANTHAKUMAR  Institutional Lock-in in Natural Resource
Management: The Case of Water Resources in Kerala,  April 1997.
W.P.  275 G. OMKARNATH   Capabilities and the process of Development
March 1997
W.P.  274 K. PUSHPANGADAN, G. MURUGAN User Financing & Col-
lective action: Relevance sustainable Rural water supply in India.
March 1997.
W.P.  273 ROBERT E. EVENSON, K.J. JOSEPH Foreign Technology
Licensing in Indian Industry : An econometric analysis of the choice
of partners, terms of contract and the effect on licensees’ perform-
ance March 1997
W.P.  272 SUNIL MANI Divestment and Public Sector Enterprise Reforms,
Indian Experience Since 1991 February 1997
W.P.  271 SRIJIT MISHRA Production and Grain Drain in two inland
Regions of Orissa  December 1996
W.P.  270 ACHIN CHAKRABORTY  On the Possibility of a Weighting
System for Functionings December 1996
51
BOOKS PUBLISHED BY THE CDS
Plight of the Power Sector in India: Inefficiency, Reform and
Political Economy
K.P. Kannan and N. Vijayamohanan  Pillai
CDS, 2002, Rs. 400/$40
Kerala’s  Gulf Connection:  CDS Studies on International Labour
Migration  from Kerala State in India
K.C. Zachariah, K. P. Kannan, S. Irudaya Rajan (eds)
CDS, 2002, pp  232,  Hardcover,  Rs. 250/$25
Performance of Industrial Clusters: A Comparative Study of
Pump Manufacturing Cluster in Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu) &
Rubber Footwear Cluster in Kottayam (Kerala)
P. Mohanan  Pillai
CDS, 2001, pp 158, Paperback,  Rs. 175/$18
Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy :  A Case Study
of Selected Issues With Reference to Kerala
United Nations, 2000 (reprint), pp 235
(available for sale in India only), Rs. 275
Land Relations and Agrarian Development  in India:A Comparative
Historical Study of Regional Variations
Sakti  Padhi
CDS,1999. pp 335, Hardcover,  Rs. 425/$48
Agrarian Transition Under Colonialism: Study of A Semi Arid
Region of Andhra, C.1860-1900
GN Rao
CDS,1999. pp 133, Paperback, Rs. 170/ $19
Property Rights, Resource Management & Governance: Crafting
An Institutional Framework  for  Global Marine Fisheries
John Kurien
CDS & SIFFS, 1998. pp 56, Paperback, Rs. 50/ $10
52
Health, Inequality and Welfare Economics
Amartya Sen
CDS. 1996. pp 26, Paperback, Rs. 70/ $ 10
Industrialisation in Kerala: Status of Current Research and Future
Issues
P Mohanan Pillai & N Shanta
CDS. 1997. pp 74, Paperback, Rs. 110/ $ 12
CDS  M.Phil Theses (1990/91-1993/94):  A Review Vol.II
T T Sreekumar
CDS. 1996. pp 99, Paperback, Rs. 120/$ 14
Trends In Agricultural Wages in Kerala 1960-1990
A A Baby
CDS. 1996. pp 83, Paperback, Rs. 105/ $ 12
CDS  M.Phil Theses (1975/76-1989/90): A Review Vol.1
G N Rao
CDS. 1996. pp 162, Paperback, Rs. 155/ $ 18
Growth of Education in Andhra - A Long Run View
C Upendranath
CDS. 1994. pp 158, Paperback, Rs. 135/ $ 15
Growth of Market Towns in Andhra:  A Study of  the Rayalseema
Region C 1900-C.1945
Namerta
CDS. 1994. pp 186, Paperback, Rs.125/ $ 14
Floods  and Flood Control Policies: an Analysis With Reference to
the  Mahanadi Delta in Orissa
Sadhana Satapathy
CDS. 1993 pp 98, Paperback, Rs. 110/$ 12
Growth of Firms in Indian Manufacturing Industry
N Shanta
CDS. 1994. pp 228, Hardcover, Rs. 250/ $ 28
Demographic Transition in Kerala in the 1980s
K C Zachariah, S Irudaya Rajan, P S Sarma, K Navaneetham,
P S Gopinathan Nair & U S Mishra,
CDS. 1999 (2nd Edition) pp 305, Paperback, Rs.250/ $ 28
53
Impact of External Transfers on the Regional Economy of Kerala
P R Gopinathan Nair & P Mohanan Pillai
CDS 1994. pp 36, Paperback, Rs.30/ $ 10
Urban Process in Kerala 1900-1981
T T Sreekumar
CDS. 1993. pp 86, Paperback, Rs.100/ $ 11
Peasant Economy and The Sugar Cooperative: A Study Of The
Aska Region in Orissa
Keshabananda Das
CDS. 1993. pp 146, Paperback, Rs.140/ $ 16
Industrial Concentration and Economic Behaviour: Case Study of
Indian Tyre Industry
Sunil Mani
CDS. 1993. pp 311, Hardcover, Rs. 300/ $ 34
Limits To Kerala Model of Development: An Analysis of Fiscal
Crisis  and Its Implications.
K K George
CDS. 1999 (2nd edition) pp 128, Paperback, Rs. 160/ $ 18
Indian Industrialization: Structure and Policy Issues. (No Stock)
Arun Ghosh, K K Subrahmanian, Mridul Eapen & Haseeb A Drabu
(EDs).
OUP. 1992. pp 364, Hardcover, Rs.350/ $ 40
Rural Household Savings  and Investment: A Study of Some
Selected Villages
P G K Panikar, P Mohanan Pillai & T K Sundari
CDS. 1992. pp 144, Paperback, Rs. 50/ $ 10
International Environment, Multinational Corporations and Drug
Policy
P G K Panikar, P Mohanan Pillai & T K Sundari
CDS. 1992. pp 77, Paperback, Rs.40/ $ 10
Trends in Private Corporate Savings
N Shanta
CDS. 1991. pp 90, Paperback, Rs. 25/ $ 10
54
Coconut Development in Kerala: Ex-post Evaluation
D Narayana, K N Nair, P Sivanandan, N Shanta and
G N Rao
CDS. 1991. pp 139, Paperback, Rs.40/ $ 10
Caste and The Agrarian Structure
T K Sundari
Oxford & IBH. 1991. pp 175, Paperback, Rs.125/ $ 14
Livestock Economy of Kerala
P S George and K N Nair
CDS. 1990. pp 189, Hardcover, Rs. 95/ $ 10
The Pepper Economy of India (No Stock)
P S George, K N Nair and K Pushpangadan
Oxford & IBH. 1989. pp 88, Paperback, Rs. 65/ $ 10
The Motor Vehicle Industry in India
(Growth within a Regulatory Environment)
D Narayana
Oxford & IBH. 1989. pp 99, Paperback, Rs. 75/ $ 10
Ecology or Economics in Cardamom Development
(No Stock)
K N Nair, D Narayana and P Sivanandan
Oxford & IBH. 1989. pp 99, Paperback, Rs. 75/ $ 10
Land Transfers and Family Partitioning
D Rajasekhar
Oxford and IBH. 1988. pp 90, Hardcover, Rs. 66/ $ 10
Essays  in Federal Financial Relations
I S Gulati and K K George
Oxford and IBH. 1988. pp 172, Hardcover, Rs. 82/ $ 10
Bovine Economy in India
A Vaidyanathan
Oxford & IBH. 1988. pp 209, Hardcover,  Rs. 96/ $ 11
Health Status of Kerala
P G K Panikar and C R Soman
CDS. 1984. pp 159, Hardcover , Rs.100/ $ 11 &  Paperback, Rs. 75/ $ 10
55
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs  3.0 Licence. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
